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Background
In the early 1980s, awareness grew of the important role that R&D plays in the
process of economic growth. As a result of this, both the policy makers and academia
institutionalised the idea that “technological development had a significant impact on
the growth in economic disparity between the regions in Europe” (European
Commission, 1997:339)
The relevance of technological development regarded as the engine of economic
growth has recently been reinforced as the European Union (EU) under the special
summit of Lisbon (March, 2000) declared that “over the next ten years, Europe should
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge society in the world, capable of
sustainable economic development, accompanied by a quantitative and qualitative
improvement in the level of employment, and greater social cohesion”. This statement
put research and development and technology as one of the key policies the EU
should pursuit.
However, the EU investment in R&D lags behind when compared to other
industrialised areas. In this sense, the EU investment in R&D does not represent more
than 1.8%
1 of the GDP, while this measures rises up to 2.6% and 2.8% for the United
States and Japan.
Moreover, this gap tents to increase since the average annual growth in R&D
expenditure in the EU has been around 3% in the last five years, while in the USA
raised over 5% and over 4% in Japan.
Nevertheless, this situation is not even across the EU. Statistics show that there exists
among the fifteen EU member states a “technology gap”, which is more than twice as
large as the “economic gap”. At this respect, in the EU, we could distinguish four
different sets of countries. The first group is composed of the Nordic countries:
Finland and Sweden. These countries, with strong telecommunication sectors, count
on high R&D investment levels, comparable to those levels reached in Japan and the
US. The members of the second group, would be those countries with lower levels
than the Nordic countries, but still above the EU average. These countries are
Denmark, France, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom. The third set of
countries would be those situated slightly below the average: Ireland, the Netherlands
and Austria. The final group gathers those Member States with levels far behind the
EU average. Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece rank in this last group. As we can see,
national efforts on R&D differ greatly from one member state to another. One
example of this disparity between Member states could be the fact that Sweden invest
700% more in R&D than Greece.
1 Source: European Commission. DG RTD (2000)Source: European Commission DG RTD (2000)
A more detail analysis would show that, there are great differences at the national
level in the Member States. However, which is the trend that is being followed? Are
R&D activities concentrating more in those areas with already high levels of R&D?
Countries such as Finland and Ireland have increased their R&D investments up to
13.02% and 10.92% respectively, 400% and 350% more than the EU average. The
reason for this drastic increase is that these two small countries have based their
economic structure on high tech sectors.
Equally, one should also remark the fact that after this outstanding evolution for these
two countries, there has been a proportionally higher investment in R&D expenditure,
being carried out by countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece; which were those
which had lower levels. On the other hand, it is also remarkable that countries with
relative high level of resources devoted to Research, such as France, the United
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As we can see, there are increasing efforts from peripheral countries to narrow the gap
in technology. In particular, the examples of Portugal (a country which has increased
its R&D expenditure by 10% each year) or Spain (with increases at a rate of 6.32%)
are very explanatory. Portugal and Spain have devoted to R&D activities over 300%
and 200% the EU average.
This increasing effort from peripheral regions has been recognised, but still it remain
well behind the EU average and its overall objective.
However, who is investing in these countries? Although it is true that both the
private and the public sectors have increased their investments in R&D, it is the
public sector which has been proportionally increasing its investment in the peripheral
regions. In this sense, and just as an example, the proportion of public investment in
objective 1 regions of Spain and Portugal represented over 70% of the overall
investment, which strongly contrasts with levels of 25% in non-objective 1 regions of
France or Germany.
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These figures reveal that it is mainly a public effort, which is being carried out in
order to foster technology advance in lagging regions. It seems that the private sector
lacks of incentives to invest in R&D in these regions, and this fact may make us
wonder whether this type of investment answers mainly to political, rather than
economic, arguments. Besides, it is also important to highlight the fact that private
and public investments in R&D may pursuit different type of objectives. In a broad
sense, one could think that public R&D would focus more on the development of
science, while private R&D would follow commercially oriented research, which
would have an a priori stronger impact on innovation and economic growth. This fact
leads us to mention what has been called the “European Paradox”, excellence in basic
science and failure to develop innovations in terms of patents.
This idea is corroborated by the available data on the number of patents which is
available for the different Member States:
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Finally, the European Council of Barcelona in march 2002 has emphasised the
necessity of devoting increasing resources to R&D activities if the overall goal of the
Lisbon Council (to become the most competitive and dynamic economy in 10 years)
is to be achieved. In this sense, the European Union and its Member States agreed to
increased its R&D expenditure up to 3% of the GDP in the following years, as a mean
to catch-up and overpass other economies, such as the American or the Japanese ones.
A closer analysis of the R&D investment composition reveals that the EU lags behind
from other economies, due to the small private investment rates. Thus, the Barcelona
Council did also conclude that at least two thirds of the overall investment in R&D
should be coming from the private sector. At this respect and in order to incentive
private investment, the European Commission foresees a series of measures, such as
tax credits, better property right protection, further development of the venture capital
scheme or a more favourable institutional set-up, intended to boost private investment
in R&D. However, are these measures equally effective in all regions of the EU? Are
these measures equally suitable for all regions? Will all regions be able to foster
private investment? Should this investment be concentrated in some dynamic regions
and allow transfer of technologies afterwards towards other regions?
Theoretical debate
Traditionally, there have been different approaches to explain the shape and factors
behind economic growth at the regional level. Two of the most influential schools of
thought in the field have been the neo-classical theory and the endogenous growth
theory, which mainly divert on the perception of the role of technology.
On the one hand, the neo-classical growth theory, as defended by Solow (1956) and
Swan (1956), describes a model where a series of standard neoclassical assumptions
about the functioning of the economy, determinate the growth path of any given
region or country. In particular, these models assume the existence of perfect
competition (and information), maximising behaviour, no externalities, constant
returns to scale
2 (the level of output one firm produces does not have an impact on the
overall structure of costs of production, and thus on the returns it achieves)
diminishing returns to each input (the marginal utility of any given extra unit of any
given input is lower than that of the previous one) and some positive and smooth
elasticity of substitution between the inputs (i.e. labour and capital can be substituted
in order to produce any given output).
Under these assumptions, the model predicts productivity growth as a result of the
increases in the amount of capital each worker is set to operate. However, as capital
per worker increases, the marginal productivity of capital declines, due to the
diminishing return on capital, and with it the scope for further increases in the
capital-labour ratio. As a result, conditional convergence between regions and
countries is predicted: the lower the starting point of real per capita GDP, relative to
the steady-state position, the faster that economy would grow.
2 Under this assumption, the production of one unit or one thousand units of output would not affect the
overall cost per unit of production.The problem with this approach, following Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995:11) is that
“the long-run per capita growth rate is determined entirely by an element –the rate of
technological progress- that is outside the model, …and thus we end up with a model
of growth that explains everything but long-run growth, an obviously unsatisfactory
situation”.
More recent studies have tried to resolved this problem by introducing technology as
the key variable in the economic growth equation. This new trend has been
denominated the endogenous growth theory
3.
Romer
4 (1986) specified a model of long-run growth in which technology stopped to
be regarded as an exogenous factor outside the growth equation. He introduced the
concept of knowledge into the production equation and defended its increasing
marginal productivity, in contrast to the neoclassical assumption of diminishing
returns. In his model, Romer (1986:1003) argues that “ long-run growth is driven
primarily by the accumulation of knowledge by forward-looking, profit maximisation
agents”.
In the same line, Romer (1990) reinforces the centrality of technology with regards to
the processes of economic growth and argues for the necessity of considering
technology and technological chances as an endogenous factor, since these
technological advances are nothing else than the result of “intentional actions taken by
people who respond to market incentives”
The consequence of this new model for growth is that “the level of per capita output
in different countries need not converge, growth may be persistently slower in less
developed countries and may even fail to take place at all”
5. As we can see,
convergence is not an automatic process as predicted by the neoclassical theory.
Under these premises, divergences across regions could even broaden depending on
the level of technological effort carried out by each region (Rebelo 1991)
As a conclusion, we could say that the endogenous growth theorists have emphasised
the role of technology as the key element to foster long-run growth, and under these
principle, convergence between regions and national does not necessary occur
automatically. Divergence may be broaden depending on the technological
investment.
Some further support to the importance of technology to explain growth has been
rendered by members of the academic trend which has been denominated
“Evolutionary Economics
6” Scholars belonging to this strand (Dosi, Soete,
Verspagen, Pavitt or Kleinknecht) have pointed out that, according to their theory,
growth is a consequence of many factors which may remain outside the economic
3 The literature also refers to endogenous growth theory as the New Growth Theory
4 Romer is considered to be one of the main initiators and developers of the Endogenous Growth
Theory.
5 See Romer (1986:1003)
6 This school of thought has also been denominated as Schumepterian or neo-schumpeteriandomain. In particular they consider culture, institutions and science
7 as three key
elements which determinate long-run growth.
The central idea in this body of literature, is that economic growth cannot be
explained by distinguishing “economic” and “non economic” (especially, institutions
and technology) factors, since all of them have are interrelated and they all, with their
interrelations, shape the process of economic growth. Dosi (1984) establishes the
importance of a “social system” where innovation is generated as the result of
different separate “domains”: technological, economic and institutional domains.
Therefore, for these authors, any model which just regards economic factors (such as
R&D, or capital accumulation) is far too narrow and ill-defined.
Under this perspective, the economy is a process of constant transformation, and the
changes of institutions and technologies over time are the key factors which drive
economic growth. Thus, if economy is in a constant transformation, the differences in
economic growth are hard to predict a priori since it is difficult to predict the
evolution of all the involved factors and their interaction. This fact also implies that in
the long run, economic convergence between nations and regions does not need to be
achieved automatically. The process of convergence or divergence would depend
upon the developments of institutions and technological change. In fact, convergence
and divergence could appear at the same time for a series of countries, giving birth to
the creation of “Regional Clubs”
8
As a conclusion we see that economists have always identified technological change
as the key factor behind economic growth. It is clear after this review, that there have
been differences among scholar in the way technological change works. In this sense,
neoclassical theorists believed technology was an exogenous factor publicly available
to every firm and region; while new growth theorists considered it to be endogenous
to the growth model and regarded it as a partly public, partly private good. Finally,
Schumpeterians believe in the effects of cumulativeness of innovations and the
different capabilities of firms and regions to do so depending on their historical and
institutional background.
Nevertheless, in recent years new approaches have been introduced in this ongoing
debate of determining the successful factors behind Regional Economic Growth.
These “technology theories” have enhanced the importance of knowledge and
innovation.
It is widely accepted that technology and technological advances are the main factor
behind innovation. Authors, such as Bershnahan and Trajtenberg (1992) have
reinforced this importance of technology by arguing that “advanced technology and
information is the single most important force driving the secular process of economic
growth”. In the same line, Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) or
Lichtenberg (1992) have showed the relationship between investment in technology
and in R&D and increases in productivity and growth
Traditionally, investment in R&D has been regarded as one of the key policies to
secure technological potential and therefore innovation and, consequently, growth.
7 See Freeman and Soete (1987) or Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990)
8 Verspagen (1997), Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996)R&D increases the possibility to achieve a higher standard of technological advances
for firms and regions, which would allow them to introduce new and superior
products and/or processes conducting to higher levels of income and growth. The
relationship between the variables ( From R&D to Technology Potential to Innovation
to growth) seems to be, as the path for policy makers to follow, thus, clearly defined.
Nevertheless, there are a series of questions which seem to introduce some doubts
about the validity or suitability of investing in R&D in all type of regions in general,
and lagging regions in particular.
One of the main concerns is closely linked to the fact that R&D activities are very
costly and in general they require a high amount of resources before being capable
of providing a technological advancement and thus yield the economic effort of the
investment. This question is especially sensitive for lagging regions, which
traditionally have lacked from a clear-cut scientific and technological strategy.
Moreover, and reinforcing this idea, many scholars –i.e. Scherer 1982- have
highlighted the existence of increasing returns on investment of R&D activities.
These increasing returns arise thanks to the positive economies of scale and scope
derived from further concentration of these activities.
A second factor which may play an important role in deterring lagging regions from
investing in R&D is, as mentioned by Storper (1995) the fact that innovations linked
to technology are non-rival and non-excludable goods – new ideas can be used at a
zero marginal cost-, and difficult to appropriate. Technological developments tent to
be mobile and, although there may be attempts from firms to capture the results of the
research initiatives, these forms (patents, lead-time) are regarded as highly
imperfect
9,and technological advances can finally spread out throughout the economy.
A third factor which may question the necessity of investing in R&D in lagging
regions may arise when analysing the fact that innovation may spill over from
leading to lagging regions. Due to the above-mentioned public nature of knowledge
and its difficulty to be appropriated, firms may not have an incentive to invest in
R&D, hoping to benefit from research efforts carried out by other firms.
As we can see, all these three factors (requirement of a minimum threshold and
positive externalities, appropriation of innovations linked to technology and the
existence of innovation spillovers) seem to call for an innovation model which would
tent to agglomerate all the R&D activities in, already technological advanced regions,
so that the general system would benefit from higher returns of scale and
technological spillovers. From that point of view the developed innovations in these
regions would then spill over to all the other lagging regions.
However, there are also some drawbacks in this strategy which are important to
highlight and which would incentive a lagging region to invest in R&D activities and
avoid free-riding.
9 See Harabi (1995)Firstly, even if one can admit the existence of increasing returns on investment due to
the economies of scale and scope associated with the accumulation of R&D efforts,
that fact, as pointed out by Rodriguez-Pose (1999), does not mean that investment in
R&D in lagging regions cannot be profitable, or at least they may report higher
returns than alternative investment opportunities for those regions.
Secondly, it is true that technology is mobile and difficult to appropriate; but this
mobility is not costless or territorially even.
As we can see, technological spillovers as described above and their diffusion
mechanisms are complex and not all firms or regions may be endowed to benefit from
them.
A further factor which would influence the ability of firms and regions to benefit from
technological spillovers is the fact that in order to do so, these firms and regions
would require “learning capacity” to actually obtain any valuable since they may not
be able of using this knowledge, due to a lack of skills. Therefore, in order to acquire
this capacity firms would have to invest in order to upgrade their level of “knowledge
literacy”
These two factors indicating the costs of benefiting from spillovers have been backed
up by empirical evidence. Evidence shows that technological spillovers tend to cluster
in some specific geographical locations (geography does indeed matter).
Thus, who benefits more from spillovers?
From a geographical point of view, and as a result of the difficulties to benefit from
technological spillovers , as we have seen above, innovative firms tent to agglomerate
in given technological advanced regions and therefore, these regions which are close
to the foci of innovation generation, which besides already count on a high level of
skilful labour and accumulative knowledge and which are better related to other
innovative regions seem to be the major beneficiaries from spillovers.
On the contrary, it seems that peripheral regions would not benefit from these
spillovers (at least not to the same extent) since geographically, they remain distant
from the innovation poles and with difficult access to innovative networks. Moreover,
these regions are characterised by a lack of “learning capacity” due to their low levels
of starting knowledge and skills.
Under these predictions, peripheral regions would fall into a self-reinforcing vicious
circle, difficult to escape from. An initial disadvantage in terms of innovative
capability would lead any given region to lower levels of production and thus growth
rate. This lower growth would deter, according to the agglomeration phenomenon of
innovation, further innovation to occur and thus, lower rates of growth would
perpetually remain.
The relevance of these questions about the public intervention in undertaking R&D
activities is even enhanced by the rise of new approaches highlighting the importance
of formal and informal institutions in the “learning process
10” and the creation
and assimilation of knowledge and innovation.
10 The concept of “learning” has been described by Lundvall as the most important process a firm and a
region has to undertake in order to foster “innovation” and associated economic growthSoete and ter Weel (2000) defend the idea that technical change is “a complex
dynamic process that involves many social and economic factors and a wide range
of individual, institutions and firms” In this context, “the capacity of an economy to
derive competitive advantages from technical change and innovation is in the end
dependent on the dynamic efficiency with which firms and institutions can diffuse,
adapt and apply information and knowledge”
At the regional level, the relevance of the social factors in the ability of a region and
the organisations there based, to innovated had also been highlighted. In this sense,
Verspagen (1997) argues that the ability of a region or country to either innovate (or
imitate innovations) depends heavily on institutions such as the educational system
which are determined by the overall social conditions of a region.
The importance of institutions has also been pointed out by many other scholars. It is
of particular interest the approaches which believe in the necessity to enhance
“Innovation Systems” within a region or a nation as a mechanism to create and
capture innovation.
Richard R. Nelson
11 (1993) argues that Innovation Systems are a “way of describing
and analysing the set of institutions that generate and mould economic growth, to the
extent that one has a theory of economic growth in which technological innovation is
the key driver”. Freeman (1987) defines them in a similar manner, arguing that they
are “a network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies” or as, Freeman
(1992:169), “ a set of institutions which are more directly concerned with scientific
and technical activities”
The basic idea behind these systems lay on the fact that the globalisation process and
the new technological advances have expose firms to increasing competition. This
fierce competition puts pressure on firms to innovate either in their products or
processes, so that they can benefit from the Schumpeterian concept of entrepreneurial
discovery. However, these innovation processes are carried out in cooperation with
other organisations as they tent to lack the resources or the ability to launch these
activities in isolation. These organisations include firms (suppliers, clients and
competitors), education institutions (universities), governments Each of these
organisations generate knowledge when interacting with the others; and it is the role
of institutions to facilitate the generation and assimilation (learning process) of this
knowledge among the different agents.
Conclusions
The role of technology and technological advance in order to foster innovation and
consequent economic growth has been recognised since the early 1980s. As a
consequence, many lagging countries and regions have increased the resources they
devote to these activities in the belief that these policies would increase their
economic competitiveness, and economic growth. Most of this effort has come from
11 See chapter 2 of “Regional Innovation, Knowledge and Global Change”, Edited by Acs, Z.the public sector, as a mechanism to create the basic infrastructure and try to mobilise
the private initiative.
The results and convenience of these policies are difficult to assess. From a theoretical
point of view, there exists a controversy about the possibility that the increasing
efforts of the public sector to foster technological advance in lagging regions of the
European Union may not be yielding the expected results. Arguments about the need
to reach a minimum threshold of resources in order to obtain a significant result, the
lack of the necessary social and knowledge infrastructure the possibility to benefit
from technological spillovers coming from other agents or the existence of increasing
returns on investment of R&D activities could suggested the failure of these type of
policies. On the other hand, the lack of mobility of knowledge or the need to count on
a minimum “learning capacity” seems to call for the further development of these
activities in lagging regions.
Empirically, it is difficult to establish the direct relationship between investing in
R&D and fostering innovation and economic growth. There are many factors
influencing both innovation and economic growth and it is difficult to isolate one
from the other. Studies analysing convergence across different regions in the
European Union have revealed that further divergence may be occurring despite these
efforts. Nonetheless, a more in-depth analysis should be carried out.
Therefore, the topic remains controversial and further light should be shed upon this
aspect in order to provide clearer guidelines for policy makers.Bibliography
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